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Extraterritorial Application of
Competition Laws: An English View
Introduction
The proliferation of national competition laws' in Western Europe and in
many other parts of the world outside of North America has largely been a
development of the past thirty years. These laws have all evolved very dif-
ferently from those of the United States, where competition is regarded as an
end in itself, and from each other, since they are generally used as a means
toward some further end.
Serving as tools of national policy, for instance to combat price inflation,
increase productivity, stimulate innovation, encourage more efficient means
of supply and distribution and to prevent the growth of excessive economic
power in the private sector of industry, the extent to which they are used for
any of these purposes and the manner of enforcing them differs considerably
from country to country, depending on a wide variety of factors. Thus one
government may encourage greater concentrations of industry in order to
assist its national companies to meet increasing competition from foreign
companies or to enable them to secure sufficient specialized skills or capital
so as to cope with the demands of innovation. Another government may
conclude that concentration has in general gone far enough and needs to be
regulated. Some countries may decide that increased productivity or more
efficient means of supply and distribution can best be secured by regulating
certain sectors of their economy or by more State ownership, although they
may possibly still maintain restraints on the freedom of unregulated compa-
nies in the private sector voluntarily to restrict their own relationships.
With regard to restrictive practices there are considerable differences as to
how they should be controlled, even though there has developed a large
amount of agreement as to what practices may be harmful. Thus price-fixing
arrangements between competitors may be prohibited outright, without pos-
*Barrister, United Kingdom.
'The term "competition law" is used in this paper to cover monopolies, mergers and restric-
tive trade practices legislation and what are known in the United States as the antitrust laws.
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sibility of justification, as in the United States,' or may be permitted if satis-
factorily justified by the parties on the grounds specified in the law, as in the
United Kingdom. In yet other countries price-fixing may only be prohibited if
found to be contrary to the public interest or may only be discouraged by
adverse publicity. Infringement of the prohibitions may lead to either civil or
criminal proceedings or both, in which the court may merely issue an injunc-
tion against repetition of the practice or else it may impose penalties in the
way of fines or imprisonment. On the other hand, the law may only provide
for the issuance of recommendations by the competent authority to cease the
practice in question.
With the continuing expansion of international trade, growth of multina-
tional enterprises and interrelation of many national problems, numerous
States have sought to cooperate to deal with matters of mutual concern. Yet
in practice such international cooperation in relation to matters in the area of
competition law involves many problems.
As a British judge recently said in the House of Lords (the United
Kingdom's highest court of appeal) in a case involving the seeking by a
United States court from two British companies of documents required for
United States antitrust proceedings: "It is axiomatic that in antitrust matters
the policy of one State may be to defend what it is the policy of another State
to attack." ' Thus country A may permit, indeed actively encourage, export
cartels which may further its national trade interests but may harm those of
country B and which country A would never permit if the parties to the export
cartels were nationals of country B and the cartels affected the interests of
country A. Webb-Pomerene Export Associations, which are permitted under
United States legislation,' provide an illustration in point.
The laws of various countries may permit other types of cartels which in
particular circumstances are regarded as in the national interest, but are not
necessarily in the interest of other countries, for example, "depression car-
tels" and "rationalization cartels" under the Japanese Antimonopoly Act
and structural crises cartels, "emergency cartels" and again various forms of
rationalization cartels under the German Act Against Restraints on Competi-
tion.
A government may decide that a matter is of such importance to it that its
interests must necessarily override any conflicting interests of another State.
If the matter relates to acts of nationals of that second State carried out
within the territory of that State and not contrary to its laws, the second State
may well consider it to be an infringement of its sovereignty for the first State
to assert jurisdiction over those acts, on the basis of alleged effects on its
domestic or foreign trade or commerce.
'United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
'Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., [19781 2 W.L.R. 81, 94 (Lord Wilberforce).
'Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 516 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65
(1976)).
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In order to substantiate its case against nationals of foreign countries State
A may wish to obtain oral and written evidence from these countries. Here
again conflicts may arise through differences of view as to what is acceptable
for this purpose. State A may seek pretrial discovery of whole classes of
documents which may not be specifically described. This may be unjustifi-
able under the laws of State B. Differences may also exist between States as to
how far certain documents or categories of documents are to be regarded as
confidential or subject to legal professional privilege or other categories of
privilege. These various differences may therefore lead to resistance on the
part of State B to the orders of the courts or other authorities of State A, with
the aim of defending State B's sovereignty, jurisdiction and legal concepts.
These are all factors which States seeking to apply their laws extraterrito-
rially should take into account. Refusal of a State to cooperate in securing the
objectives of another State is probably no more than a reflection of dif-
ferences in economic interests, laws and procedures and concepts of jurisdic-
tion and'must not be regarded merely as indicating a wish to frustrate the
application of the laws of that other State. It must also be borne in mind that
such differences and consequent jurisdiction conflicts involve great uncer-
tainty for the companies concerned as to how they should act.
I. Jurisdiction
A. In General
In connection with proceedings brought by the European Commission
against the British company, Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. (I.C.I.
Ltd.), (and others) before the United Kingdom had joined the European
Economic Community (EEC), in what became known as the Dyestuffs case,5
the British Government submitted to the Commission an aide memoire to
which was attached a statement of principles according to which in the view
of the government jurisdiction may be exercised over foreign corporations in
antitrust matters.
This states that substantive jurisdiction in antitrust matters should only be
taken on the basis of the territorial principle or the nationality principle. It
goes on to say that the territorial principle justifies proceedings against for-
eigners and foreign companies only in respect of some conduct which consists
in whole or in part of some activity by them in the territory of the State
claiming jurisdiction. As to the nationality principle, the statement says:
The nationality principle justifies proceedings against nationals of the State claim-
ing jurisdiction in respect of their activities abroad only provided that this does not
involve interference with the legitimate affairs of other States or cause such na-
tionals to act in a manner which is contrary to the laws of the State in which the
activities in question are conducted.
'Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. European Community Comm'n, I I Comm. Mkt. L.R.
557 (1972).
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Many other countries would be in general agreement with this statement of
the principles for claiming substantive jurisdiction in antitrust matters,
though there may be certain differences in their interpretation of these princi-
ples.
More recently, in connection with the preparation of the Report of the
United States National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures, 6 the British Government submitted to the United States Govern-
ment in July 1978 a diplomatic note7 in which it stated: "HM Government
considers that in the present state of international law there is no basis for the
extension of one country's antitrust jurisdiction to activities outside of that
country of foreign nationals." 8
Whereas there would be no dispute with a claim to assert jurisdiction by a
State in whose territory certain of the acts at issue have taken place, even
though some of the acts may have taken place outside, the real area of con-
troversy is where jurisdiction is claimed over conduct outside on the basis
solely of effects within the territory.'
The controversy over the so-called effects doctrine has for the most part
been with the United States, which not only claims jurisdiction on the basis of
effects on interstate trade within the United States but also of effects on the
foreign trade and commerce of the United States. Although the laws of some
other States provide for jurisdiction on the basis of effects within the territory
of conduct outside, for the most part either these provisions have never been
applied'" or else jurisdiction has been asserted not solely on the basis of
effects, but essentially on acts within the territory.
The Common Market rules of competition apply where conduct causing a
restriction or distortion of competition has had a noticeable effect on trade
between member States. Conduct outside the Common Market having such
effect could therefore be caught, but in practice there have in almost all cases
been acts within the jurisdiction. In the Dyestuffs case, for instance, the
European Court found that I.C.I. Limited and two Swiss companies had
done business within the European Economic Community (EEC) through
subsidiaries which could be regarded as their branches or agents, since the
6 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL [hereinafter cited as REPORT], reprinted in 897
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Spec. Supp. Jan. 22, 1979).
'Submission of Charles F. Meissner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance
and Development, Department of State, on behalf of the British Embassy, Washington, D.C.,
to the Antitrust Commission, (July 28, 1978) (forwarding Diplomatic Note 196, dated July 27,
1978, concerning the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws).
'REPORT, supra note 6, at 84.
'Grounds for claiming jurisdiction in other than antitrust matters vary from country to coun-
try, except where they have been harmonized as between signatories to a Convention such as the
EEC Convention on Jurisdition and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters. The extraterritorial application of competition laws, which is the sole concern of this
paper, gives rise to special problems between countries requiring general resolution.
'By way of exception section 98(2) of the German Act against Restraints of competition has
occasionally been applied.
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subsidiaries enjoyed no real autonomy of action in the market and therefore
in each case formed one economic unit with its parent." Where, however, the
parent company does not use its foreign subsidiary as its agent to carry on
business on its behalf, it is important that corporate distinctions should be
respected. The parent company should not be regarded as subject to the
jurisdiction of the foreign State where its subsidiary operates, or vice versa,
solely by reason of the parent-subsidiary relationship.
Since even if substantive jurisdiction is claimed with regard to acts outside
the territory; there remains the question of securing personal jurisdiction
over the parties to those acts, based on sufficient presence within the terri-
tory, the recognition of corporate distinctions between parent companies and
their foreign subsidiaries is of course very important in this regard.
There is also the question of securing the evidence to substantiate the alle-
gations on which jurisdiction is claimed. Here United States procedures, as
extended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 2
enable far-reaching investigations to be made outside the United States, often
of a kind known as a fishing expedition and giving rise to conflicts of jurisdic-
tion. This, however, is not merely an issue arising out of the application of
United States law, but a general problem. For this reason the collection of
information by antitrust authorities in foreign countries is at present the
subject of a study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment Committee of Government Experts.
Because of the conflicts of national interests which have developed in the
areas of trade and commerce covered by competition law, leading to diplo-
matic protests or governmental interventions in the foreign court proceed-
ings, certain defenses have been admitted under the laws or court judgments
of countries claiming jurisdiction over foreign acts, in particular where those
acts have been ordered by foreign governments. Numbers of countries have
also introduced statutory measures to protect their sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion. These too will be examined, but first further consideration will be given
to the effects doctrine.
B. The Effects Doctrine
The United States antitrust laws were first applied to conduct entirely out-
side the United States and involving solely foreign companies in 1945, in
United States v. Aluminum Company of America,' 3 on the basis that their
practices were "intended to affect and did affect" 4 the foreign commerce of
"Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. European Community Comm'n, I I Comm. Mkt. L.R.
557 (1972).
'290 Stat. 1383 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 U.S.C). This Act enables the
government in civil antitrust matters to serve civil investigative demands on potential witnesses
with requests for oral testimony and written answers to questions, whereas previously only
documentary evidence could be sought from an alleged infringer of the law when a complaint
had already been filed or a grand jury convened to make an investigation.
'1148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
'4d. at 419.
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the United States. This was later limited by the judgment in the United States
v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. '5 to acts having a
"substantial and material effect"'' 6 and this concept was incorporated into
the American Law Institute's 1965 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, Section 18 of which stipulates:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal sys-
tems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the terri-
tory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recog-
nized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems. 7
After many years of study of this issue, the International Law Association,
in a Resolution adopted in 1972, developed a similar formulation but with the
important qualification that the effect within the territory must occur "as a
direct and primarily intended result of the conduct outside the territory." In
the opinion of numbers of non-United States Governments and companies,
the United States has often attempted to assert jurisdiction on the basis of
some presumed effects which are far from obvious.
In practice, however, there has not been any decision of United States
federal courts since the Alcoa case in 1945 in which jurisdiction has been
based solely on the conduct of foreign nationals entirely outside the territory
of the United States and not implemented by acts performed within that
territory.
As was observed by a United States federal court of appeals in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America'8 citing a former Attorney-General: "Any-
thing which affects the external trade and commerce of the United States also
affects the trade and commerce of other nations, and may have far greater
consequences for others than for the United States."'"
The effects test by itself was, therefore, in the court's opinion incomplete
in that it failed to consider the other nation's interests. Nor did it take into
account the full nature of the relationship between the alleged offender and
the United States. It would for instance make a big difference if he were an
American citizen.
"[1963] TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 70,600, at 77,415 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
'61d. at 77,457.
17RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
"1549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
"Id. at 611 (quoting former Attorney General Katzenbach).
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The court therefore concluded that one of the factors which should be
taken into account in relation to the alleged restraint's effect on United States
foreign commerce was whether, as a matter of international comity and fair-
ness, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States should be asserted
to cover it. This involves a balancing of national interests and obviously
everything will depend on how this is carried out, how objective it really is.
Section 40 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, to which the judge referred, sets forth the
criteria which a court should take into account. These include:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state."0
Nevertheless, the balancing will seldom be a simple task, and with the court
of one nation doing it, there will often be a tendency for the judge to decide
that his nation's interests are so vital that they will necessarily override any
conflicting foreign interests.2 ' This was for instance the approach taken by a
United States court in a case where an American bank was required to pro-
duce the records held by its German branch, the court holding that the United
States' interest in enforcing its antitrust laws outweighed in this case the
interests of West Germany and any hardships that might ensue to the defen-
dent in that country. 22
Similarly, in another case involving a demand for the production of rec-
ords located in Canada, where production would have contravened specific
Canadian legislation 23 and a waiver from such law had been expressly denied,
the Santa Fe County District Court in New Mexico observed:
deference to the sovereignty and national interest of Canada or its provinces cannot
be accomplished through sacrifice of the sovereignty of New Mexico and of due
process of law and equal application and protection of law afforded by the laws of
New Mexico. In this forum, the aforesaid laws of this forum which protect the
fundamental public policy of this State must govern over the national interest or
policy of a foreign country as legislated and conceived by that foreign country." 24
2 0
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §40 (1965).
'The interpretation by Assistant Attorney-General Shenefield of the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division of Judge Choy's judgment in the Timberlane case was that the judge was not
requiring such a balancing of national interests, but rather than "the interests of the United
States in prosecuting the violation be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively against the
potential damage to United States's foreign relations that might result." Address by Assistant
Attorney-General Shenefield, American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1978).
22United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
" Uranium Information Security Regulations.
"United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., Pet. I App 3a-4a (1977).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has so far declined to review this
particular finding, though the Supreme Court of New Mexico did hear the
case.25 This issue has been the subject of diplomatic notes from the Canadian
Government, as will be examined later, and in the United States Supreme
Court hearing the Canadian Government intervened as amicus curiae.
However, in another case, also involving the production of documents
located in Canada, subsequent to the Timberlane decision, the decision of
another United States court was reversed by a circuit court of appeals because
the lower court had failed to consider the legitimate Canadian interest in the
disclosure of the documents and had not conducted any balancing of in-
terests, since it also took the view that the law of the forum must prevail. 6 In
a still more recent decision of another federal court of appeals27 the court
stated that it found itself in substantial agreement with the balancing ap-
proach of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Timberlane case and
listed ten factors similar to those in section 40 of the American Law
Institute's Restatement which it felt should be included among those to be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction.
In some earlier cases, as a result of government interventions with regard to
proceedings abroad against their nationals, provisos were made to United
States court judgments to give recognition to the sovereign power of other
governments as to acts within their territories. Thus, in the judgment (revised
after Swiss Government intervention) given by a federal court in 1965 in
Swiss Watchmakers, the following provision was included:
... nothing contained in this Final Judgment shall be deemed to:
(L) Limit or circumscribe the sovereign right and power of the Government of the
Swiss Confederation or any agency thereof, or specifically the sovereign right and
power of the Government of the Swiss Confederation or any agency thereof to
control or regulate its domestic or foreign commerce or to make and apply regula-
tions with respect to the watch-making industry or any part thereof.2'
Similarly, in United States v. General Electric Co., 9 after the Netherlands
Government had protested against a decree enjoining the Dutch company,
Philips, from further violation of the United States antitrust laws, a "sav-
ing" clause was inserted by the court as follows:
... Philips shall not be in contempt of this judgment for doing anything outside of
the United States which is required or for not doing anything outside of the United
290 N.M. 97 (1976).
"In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Litigation, 11977] 2 TRADE CASES (CCH)
61,724, at 72,948 (10th Cir. 1979).
"Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., [19791 I TRADE CASES (CCH) 162,547 (3d Cir.
1979) (plaintiff alleged that the defendant had sought to monopolize certain United States export
commerce by fraudulently procuring foreign patents and enforcing them by threatening and
bringing infringement suits in foreign courts against the defendant and other United States
exporters seeking access to those markets).
"United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center Inc., [19651 TRADE CASES
(CCH) 171,352, at 80,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
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States which is unlawful under the laws of the government, province, country or
state in which Philips or any other subsidiaries may be incorporated, chartered or
organized or in the territory of which Philips or any such subsidiaries may be doing
business. 0
However, for political, economic, or other reasons a government may not
always be willing, or consider it appropriate, to intervene on behalf of its
nationals arraigned before a foreign court for their conduct outside the coun-
try of that court. The effect of a State's assertion of jurisdiction should not be
dependent on whether or not another State decides to protest. In any case,
comity requires consideration not merely of the interests of the country where
the proceedings are brought or contemplated, but also of those of other
countries whose nationals are involved. A balancing of national interests,
which may raise complex political and economic issues and even questions of
national security, should not be resolved in domestic courts, but rather by
consultation and negotiation between governments.
As mentioned earlier there are other national competition laws which en-
able jurisdiction to be claimed on the basis of effects within the territory of
conduct outside, but with the exception of the German Act against Restraints
of Competition (of 1957), no instances are known of those provisions being
applied, so whether they would ever be applied to conduct of foreign na-
tionals solely outside the territory cannot be judged.
Section 98(2) of the German law provides that "this Act shall apply to all
restraints of competition which have effect in the area in which the Act ap-
plies, even if they result from acts done outside such areas." Although several
foreign mergers have been notified by German companies pursuant to this
provision, further action has very seldom been taken on it by the German
Cartel Office. In one case it applied section 98(1) to an acquisition of part of
the business of a United States company by an indirectly owned subsidiary of
a German parent company (Bayer A.G.). Bayer appealed to the Berlin Court
and subsequently to the Federal Supreme Court. Both Courts upheld the
decision of the Cartel Office. 3' In another case (involving an export cartel
"Id. at 878. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), [19691 TRADE CASES (CCH)
171,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (consent judgment under which the Department of Justice excluded
from the injunctions of the decree cartel arrangements-fixing prices, allocating markets or
customers, restricting imports or production, and the like-which were either a requirement of
the law of the foreign nation where the transactions took place or were entered into pursuant to a
request or official pronouncement of policy of that nation. Id. at §V(c)(l)-(2) ).
3
'The acquisition by an indirectly owned subsidiary in the United States of Bayer A.G. of the
organic pigments division of Allied Chemical Corporation (ACC) was held by the Federal Cartel
Office to be a merger for the purposes of section 23 of the German law and Bayer was therefore
required to file a formal notification of the merger. In upholding the decision of the Cartel
Office, the High Court of Berlin said that although Bayer A.G. had in 1975 and 1976 only 4.4070
and 3.5% of the German organic pigments market and ACC had only 0.14% and 0.23% shares
during those years, the merger nevertheless had perceptible effects on the domestic market for
the purposes of section 98(2). Because of it ACC ceased to be a competitor and Bayer gained
access to ACC's know-how and increased its turnover. Although, as Bayer maintained, this was
likely to improve its competitive position, this was held not to be a relevant factor for the
requirement of notification under section 23. The Court said that it would only be important in
relation to the approval or prohibition of the merger under section 24. The Court also said that
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covering exports to countries outside the EEC) the decision of the Cartel
Office applying section 98(2) was on appeal reversed by the Federal Supreme
Court. 2
Certain decisions of the European Commission have sometimes been cited
in support of the extraterritorial application of the EEC rules of competition.
These have in all instances involved acts performed within the Common
Market by subsidiaries of foreign parent companies acting under the orders
or control of those foreign parents. In several cases involving abuse of a
dominant market position under article 86, the non-EEC parent has been
held, because of the extent of that control over the Common Market subsidi-
ary, to constitute with-it a single economic entity, so that the acts within the
Common Market were treated as being acts also of the non-EEC parents.33
Obviously a company outside the Common Market entering into an agree-
ment with a company within the Community will be caught by article 85 if
that agreement is restrictive and noticeably affects trade between member
States, as where Japanese producers of ball bearings agreed with French
producers to put up their prices of ball bearings to the same level as those of
the French companies and to check on any abnormal increase of exports to
the French market.3' This too therefore relates to trading within the Commu-
nity and does not therefore support the application of the effects doctrine.
Likewise where a number of Canadian importers conspired with Japanese
exporters to fix the prices of oranges, fix quotas, limit production and per-
form other acts unlawful under Canadian law, the defense that the Canadian
statute could have no extraterritorial effect was inapplicable since "overt acts
within British Columbia were participated in by all ten of the accused.""
C. Collection of Information in Foreign Countries
1. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
As indicated in connection with our examination of the effects doctrine,
many of the problems which arise in this area result from the seeking of
evidence in foreign countries to substantiate the assertion of subject matter
jurisdiction.
where there are effects on the domestic market there could be no exemption from notification on
the grounds that the merger had taken place in another country whose interests might also be
affected. The Federal Supreme Court, in its decision of May 29, 1979, confined itself to agreeing
with the reasoning of the Berlin Court. The decisions therefore deal with a notification require-
ment under German law and not with the question of whether the foreign merger should be
approved or prohibited.
"Olfeldrohre, Bundesgerichtshof, West Ger., WuW/E BGH, 1276 (1973).
"See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973); Instituto
Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. E.C. Comm'n, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309 (1974) (upholding the
Commission's decision); United Brands Co. v. E.C. Comm'n; 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978);
Liptons Cash Registers v. Hugin Kassaregister, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D19 (1978).
"In re Franco-Japanese Ballbearing Agreement, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D8 (1975). See also
Community v. Associated Lead Mfr. Ltd., 24 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 464 (1979).
"Regina v. Burrows, 54 Can. Pat. R. 95, 101 (1966).
Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws 655
Discovery, that is disclosure of facts and documents which are known to or
in the possession of another person and which are necessary to the party
seeking the discovery as part of his case, is broader in scope in the United
States than in other countries. There disclosure may be obtained not only
from the other parties to the proceedings but also from witnesses and those
who may be witnesses. Enquiries are not confined to relevant and admissible
evidence, but may be such as "would lead to a train of inquiry which might
itself lead to relevant material."1 36
A distinction needs first to be made between direct discovery, through for
instance civil investigative demands in United States government investiga-
tions, served on the person from whom information is required, (with sanc-
tions for noncompliance), and the taking of evidence by means of letters
rogatory (letters of request from one court to another), a procedure accepted
by many countries and used in the United States both for government and
private actions. In other words, a distinction between what in the former
instance frequently involves the seeking of documents and information with
a view to seeing whether enough evidence can be found to justify the starting
of proceedings, and what in the latter instance involves the seeking of infor-
mation and documents relating to proceedings which have already been com-
menced, to which the foreign company is a party and which relate to acts by
the foreign company within the territory of the plaintiff seeking the informa-
tion.
The latter situation generally raises few problems and is often regulated by
bilateral and multilateral conventions. An example of the latter is the 1970
Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters which replaced earlier Conventions of 1905 and 1954 and which was
signed by the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Scandinavian
countries, Czechoslovakia, and Portugal. It was subsequently implemented
by national laws such as the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions)
Act 1975 in the United Kingdom."
Section 2(4) of this Act provides that a person shall not be required to state
what relevant documents are in his possession, custody or power, nor to
produce documents other than those specified in the order of the court as
being documents appearing to the court to be or to be likely to be in his
possession, custody or power. 8 This provision is aimed against what are
generally known as "fishing expeditions," which have long been held by
English courts to be inadmissible. This has also been made clear by the British
government which for instance intervened in a recent case which reached the
"Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp. [19561 I Q.B. 618, 644.
"Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions), Act, 1975, c. 34.
'When ratifying the Hague Convention the British Government declared that they would
"not execute letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of docu-
ments", which they regarded as including letters of request for information and documents of a
type later prohibited from being produced under section 2(4).
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highest court of appeal, the House of Lords,39 when the Attorney-General
stated, inter alia, "Her Majesty's Government considers that the wide inves-
tigatory procedures under the United States anti-trust legislation against per-
sons outside the United States who are not United States citizens constitute an
infringement of the proper jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. '"40
In referring to this intervention Lord Wilberforce said that it
establishes that quite apart from the present case, over a number of years and in a
number of cases, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been against recogni-
tion of United States investigatory jurisdiction extraterritorially against United
Kingdom companies. The courts should in such matters speak with the same voice
as the executive: they have, as I have stated, no difficulty in doing so."
Insofar as other countries may seek from foreign companies information
and documents located abroad, they would generally do so only where they
clearly have subject matter jurisdiction as recognized by international law
and where formal proceedings have been instituted against the company con-
cerned. They would then follow internationally agreed procedures.
2. WHERE PRODUCTION IS CONTRARY TO FOREIGN LAW
A court may seek from parties to proceedings before it, who may be either
nationals or foreign persons, information and documents located abroad,
the seeking of which would infringe the jurisdiction under international law
of the other State and the production of which would be contrary to its
national interests or might even infringe its criminal or other laws.
Since United States courts have frequently regarded such considerations as
irrelevant or overriden by United States national interests, numbers of coun-
tries have introduced laws prohibiting or enabling the prohibition of the
production of documents or information in such circumstances. Thus, the
Netherlands Economic Competition Act of 1956 prohibits compliance with
any measures or decisions taken by any other State which relate to any regula-
tions on competition, dominant positions, or practices restricting competi-
tion unless the government has granted exemption or, if requested, dispensa-
tion, which may be subject to restrictions or directions.
Under the United Kingdom Shipping Contracts and Commercial Docu-
ments Act of 196442 where any person in the United Kingdom has been or
may be required to produce or furnish to any court or authority of a foreign
country any commercial document not within the territorial jurisdiction of
that country or commercial information compiled from such document and
"Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.4
'1d. at 93.
"Id. at 94.
4'Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87.
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it appears that the requirement constitutes or would constitute an infringe-
ment of the jurisdiction which, under international law, belongs to the
United Kingdom, the Secretary of State may prohibit that person from com-
plying with that requirement. This Act has been invoked by the government
on numbers of occasions.
Canada" (as well as the provinces of Ontario and Quebec), Australia" and
South Africa 5 have also introduced legislation to protect business records
generally, whilst various other countries have provisions in their laws to pro-
tect manufacturing or trade secrets or information relating to particular sec-
tors, such as shipping and aviation.
According, however, to section 39 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (1965), a State is not precluded from exercising its
jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in con-
duct subjecting him to liability under the law of another State having jurisdic-
tion with respect to that conduct. The party before the United States court
who is required to produce the documents or information located aboard is
therefore expected to make good faith efforts to comply by seeking from the
foreign government a waiver of the nondisclosure law or order. The re-
viewing court then considers these efforts in the light of the legal obstacles to
compliance and the relative interests of both parties and countries involved in
deciding whether and how to provide for sanctions for noncompliance.4 6
There have been numbers of cases where parties have been found by the court
not to have made a sufficient good faith effort."
43Uranium Information Security Regulations, 1976 (amended 1977). The Regulations were
passed pursuant to the Atomic Energy Control Act.
"Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, Act. No. 121 of 1976.
Two orders have been made under this Act.
:'Protection of Business Act, 1978, Act No. 99 of 1978.
'See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.
1977); Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). Both cases involved consideration
of the waiver of the very stringent provisions of article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code. This article
provides that anyone who discloses a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign government,
to a public or private enterprise, or to the agents of any of these is liable to punishment by
imprisonment and fine. See also Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1972). In the recent Adams case the Swiss High Court held it to be illegal to produce to the
European Commission documents which were located in Switzerland. In Westinghouse and
Societe Internationale, decisions of lower courts finding that sufficient good faith effort had not
been made were overruled on appeal. But the United States Supreme Court in Societe Interna-
tionale stated that the good faith bore no relation to the fact of noncompliance or the propriety
of the order to produce and was relevant only to the decision regarding appropriate sanctions.
"See, e.g.. United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). In In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, Beecham, a United Kingdom company, had been ordered by the
British Government, pursuant to the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act of
1964, c. 87, not to produce numerous requested documents. The District Court for the District of
Columbia found that sufficient good effort had not been made by Beecham to secure waiver of
the order. The British government subsequently modified its order, as then did the United States
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This requirement to seek a waiver of the foreign law or order is also gener-
ally regarded by the foreign government concerned as an infringement or
attempted infringement of its sovereignty and interference with its national
interests. Thus the Canadian government, in a note submitted to the United
States government in November 1978, pointed out that a number of parties to
various civil actions before American courts had made urgent and vigorous
requests to it for a waiver from the Uranium Information Security Regula-
tions, an amendment to them, or any other action which would enable them
to comply with the orders of the American courts. It said that it had refused
each of these requests and had continued to prevent production of the docu-
ments and the information in question since it considered such disclosure to
be inimical to the national interest of Canada. 8 The note goes on to express
the Canadian government's
serious objection to the imposition of any sanction by the judicial branch of the
United States Government for failure to produce documents or to disclose informa-
tion located in Canada where such production or disclosure would require a person
or corporation in Canada to perform an act or omission in Canada which is prohib-
ited by the Uranium Information Security Regulations or any other law of Canada.
The threat or imposition of any such sanction would have the appearance of an
attempt to induce the performance in Canada of acts which are prohibited in
Canada and of attaching liability for acts performed in Canada in accordance with
Canadian law and the publicly declared policy of the Canadian Government. Such
procedure would be inconsistent with generally accepted principles of international
law, with the manner in which the Governments of Canada and the United States
carry on their mutual relations and with the spirit of those relations.
3. CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE
Disclosure of information to foreign authorities may be precluded by con-
siderations of confidentiality or privilege. Interpretation of these concepts
differ from country to country or indeed according to the particular circum-
stances. Government departments may be prohibited from disclosing (even
to other government departments) information received in confidence from
companies without the consent of those companies. In considering how far a
document should be treated as confidential, factors such as the existence in
the United States of the Freedom of Information Act" will no doubt be
Court, J.P.M.D.L. Docket No. 50, Misc. No. 45-70 (D.D.C.) 1974. See also United States v.
Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), where United States interest in a criminal investigation was
held to outweigh the Cayman Islands' interest in preserving secrecy.
'Other governments have reacted similarly in such situations. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION'S COMMITTEE ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF RE-
STRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES LEGISLATION, pt. V (collection of extracts from published material
on official protests, directives, prohibitions and comments). The report was submitted to the
Tokyo Conference of the International Law Association in 1964.
"5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws
important. Even where an Antitrust Cooperation Agreement exists, as be-
tween the United States and Germany, the safeguard of confidentiality re-
mains an important factor in the Convention.
Privilege in respect of legal adviser-client communications is another area
where protection applies and where the position differs, sometimes consider-
ably, from country to country. Thus, in some countries, such as the United
States and the United Kingdom, the privilege belongs to the client, whilst in
other countries it belongs to the client's counsel.
Written or oral evidence may in various countries be refused on the
grounds that disclosure of certain information would be harmful to the
public interest.5" In England a person may refuse to give testimony or pro-
duce documents that might expose that person to criminal prosecution or
civil liability under English law.5" Likewise the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides privilege against self-incrimination to defen-
dants, parties, and witnesses in relation to oral testimony and documents
ordered to be produced.
These factors are therefore important considerations to be borne in mind
when one country seeks disclosure of information and documents from
another. The fact that the country seeking disclosure may not regard them as
confidential or privileged is irrelevant if the other country does.
D. Personal Jurisdiction
It is not sufficient to claim jurisdiction over the subject matter. There must
be sufficient presence of the alleged violator to bring him within reach of the
court. If the foreign company has a branch office or an agent within the
jurisdiction, having legal power to enter into contracts on its behalf, there is
generally no problem in asserting jurisdiction over the foreign company.
"in England, Crown privilege would normally be claimed by the government minister con-
cerned but may be raised by the parties and must be asserted by the court when appropriate. The
privilege would for instance be applicable where disclosure would be harmful to national defense
or to good diplomatic relations. See the decision of the House of Lords in Conway v. Rimmer,
[19681 A.C. 910, for a review of the history of the privilege and Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of
England, [1979] I W.L.R. 473, for a recent decision of the Court of Appeal concerned entirely
with Crown privilege and the production of documents and upheld by the House of Lords in a
decision of November I, 1979 but not reported as of this writing. As to the United States see
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). In certain countries this privilege may be provided
for by statute, for example in Australia under the Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain
Evidence) Act, 1976, Act No. 121 of 1976, and in the United Kingdom, where disclosure of
certain kinds of information is prohibited under various statutes, including commercial infor-
mation obtained by the government under the Fair Trading Act, 1973, c. 41, and the Statistics of
Trade Act, 1947, 10& I I Geo. 6, c. 39. In France, disclosure of various categories of information
are criminal offences. See CODE PENAL [C. PEN] arts. 75, 378, 418 (Fr).
"Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, § 14. In Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., [19781
2 W.L.R. 81, the House of Lords held that the English companies were entitled to claim privilege
under that section in respect of the documents required to be produced, since production would
tend to expose them to penalties under article 85 of the Common Market Treaty, which has the
force of law in England.
660 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
Generally it is necessary for the person to carry on business or reside in the
country where jurisdiction is sought. The courts of some countries however,
notably those of the United States, assert jurisdiction on the basis of what has
often amounted to very transitory presence and sporadic business transac-
tions. Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny suit, action, or
proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought
...in any [judicial] district wherein it may be found or transacts business.""
This is interpreted very widely. Thus the finalizing at a single meeting in New
York of the principal heads of agreement was sufficient to secure jurisdiction
in a case in 1971, for the causes of action could be said to arise from the New
York transaction although the signing of the final contract took place later at
the domicile of the foreign corporation." State "long arm" statutes have
stretched jurisdiction even further, and in their interpretation of these stat-
utes some courts have held it to be sufficient to base jurisdiction upon the fact
that an alien had "minimum" contacts with the United States and not neces-
sarily with the State of the forum.5 4 The position is not, however, clear in this
regard.
Corporate distinctions are sometimes ignored altogether where a foreign
parent company or foreign subsidiary is concerned. As the British govern-
ment stated in the aide memoire which it submitted to the European Commis-
sion in connection with the Dyestuffs case:
A foreign company may be considered to "carry on business" within the jurisdic-
tion by an agent only if the agent has legal power to enter into contracts on behalf of
the principal.
A foreign parent company may not be considered to "carry on business" within the
jurisdiction by a subsidiary company, unless it can be shown that the subsidiary is
the agent for the parent in the sense of carrying on the parent's business within thejurisdiction. The separate legal personalities of a parent company and its subsidiary
should be respected. Such concepts as "enterprise entity" and "reciprocating
partnership" when applied for the purpose of asserting personal jurisdiction over a
foreign parent company by reason of the presence within the jurisdiction of a sub-
sidiary (and a foreign subsidiary by reason of the presence of its parent company)
are contrary to sound legal principle in that they disregard the distinction of per-
sonality between parent and subsidiary."
With regard to the seeking of information, a distinction must be made be-
tween seeking it from a parent company on domestic territory and documents
in its possession concerning its foreign subsidiaries on the one hand and, on
the other hand, seeking documents and information in the possession of the
foreign subsidiary or foreign parent company. It must be borne in mind that
because a multinational group is involved, this does not alter the fact that it is
generally made up of a series of legally autonomous companies, each of
115 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
"ECC Corp. v. Slater Electric Inc., 336 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.Y 1971).
"Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H 1977).
"Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, I I Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557, (1972).
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which is subject to the law of the country in which it operates, and hence, too,
the law governing compliance with foreign measures seeking information
from it.
If. Foreign Government Compulsion
Reference has been made in connection with discovery procedures to laws
prohibiting the production of evidence to foreign courts or authorities. Simi-
lar problems arise in connection with acts required by the government of one
country but which are regarded as anticompetitive and contrary to its laws by
the government or courts of another country.
In the United States a distinction has been made between on the one hand
where private parties have engaged in restraints of competition ordered by a
foreign government as a sovereign power, and on the other hand where they
have merely been authorized or informally encouraged by the foreign govern-
ment to engage in the restraints and they voluntarily chose to do so. In the
first instance the parties are exempt from the antitrust laws, but they have no
immunity in the other two.
It must, however, be recognized that other countries are often less formal
in their systems of administration and may consider it sufficient for domestic
purposes merely to approve or authorize, perhaps informally, a particular
course of action where in similar circumstances the United States might for-
mally order or command that course of action. It is therefore necessary to
take into account a country's normal practices in this regard.
Another problem lies in the territoriality of the foreign government com-
pulsion. The Antitrust Guide for International Operations'6 published by the
United States Department of Justice in January 1977, stated: "Although the
United States courts will recognize an antitrust defence for actions taken or
compelled by a foreign sovereign within its territory, such recognition will
not be afforded with respect to an act within the United States. The situation
in third countries is less clear." 57
One federal district court did allow foreign sovereign compulsion where
there was restraint within the United States, 8 but the Department of Justice
later sought to enjoin a boycott within the United States commanded by
various foreign sovereign States. 9
This proposed limitation of the Department of Justice on the act of state
and foreign Government compulsion defenses has been criticized, in that the
main consideration which underlies these defenses is that of fairness to a
"6ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE], reprinted in 799 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) at E-1.
"ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 56.
"Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
"United States v. Bechtel Corp. The case was eventually settled by consent decree. Competi-
tive Impact Statement of United States, 42 Fed. Reg. 3718 (1977).
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company which is caught between conflicting demands from two or more
sovereigns. In the event of such a conflict fairness requires rejection of "any
mechanical territorial limitation on the Defence and suggests at a minimum
the propriety of the balancing of interests approach suggested in Tim-
berlane .... ,,6" It may further be observed that the United States govern-
ment is very ready to apply its own laws in other countries, often regardless of
the laws or policies of that other country, but is not apparently prepared to
consider the reverse situation.
As had been pointed out by a senior Canadian official in relation to the
effects of United States antitrust law on compliance by Canadian companies
with Canadian legislation and policy:
If the threat of antitrust liability in the United States is a significant disincentive to
compliance with Canadian policy, then the Canadian Government may also have to
consider providing the necessary "cover", through legislation or other forms of
direct intervention, to confer immunity from antitrust liability. The degree of inter-
vention required for this purpose will be largely a function of the evolution of the
U.S. doctrine of foreign compulsion . . . the more restrictively that doctrine is
applied, the more foreign governments will feel obliged-whether they like it or
not-to subject the private sector to mandatory rather than flexible control.'
The need to take further steps to protect national interests has been recog-
nized by the Australian Government, which in 1979 introduced legislation to
provide for restricting the recognition and enforcement in Australia of cer-
tain foreign judgments obtained in antitrust proceedings.62 An earlier stat-
ute6 has so far proved sufficient to prevent Australian based evidence from
being produced for the purpose of United States court proceedings, where
such production was regarded as contrary to Australian national interests or
the foreign tribunal was proposing or likely to exercise jurisdiction or powers
of a kind or in a manner not consistent with international law or comity. It
cannot, however, help where Australian defendants have declined to enter
appearance before the United States courts because of jurisdictional objec-
tions to the proceedings against them, with the consequence that judgment
was made against them in default of appearance. Hence the introduction of
the new statute. Unless greater consideration is given to the interests of other
countries, more legislation of this type is likely to be introduced in other parts
of the world.
11!. Summary and Conclusions
A. Partly because of the considerable differences between national com-
petition laws and policies and the unlikelihood of agreement being reached
between States on any legally binding supranational regulation of restrictive
"Address by Professor Barry Hawk, American Bar Association Meeting (Aug. 1978).
'Stanford, The Application 9f the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A
Viewfrom Abroad, I I CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 206 (1978). Mr. Stanford is Director General of
the Bureau of Commercial and Commodity Relations, Canadian Dept. of External Affairs.
"Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, 1979.
"Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, Act No. 121 of 1976.
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trade practices and dominant economic power, problems arise because:
1. some States apply or try to apply their national laws to conduct of
foreign companies outside their territory on the basis of its effects within
the territory and even, in the case of the United States, on the basis of the
effects of that conduct on the foreign trade and commerce of the United
States;
2. in order to secure the evidence to substantiate the allegations on
which jurisdiction is claimed, some States allow discovery of a kind known
to other countries as fishing expeditions and which are generally not per-
mitted under their laws; and
3. where substantive jurisdiction is claimed with regard to acts outside
the territory, the courts of some States then secure personal jurisdiction
over the parties to those acts based on very transitory presence and spo-
radic business transactions.
B. The two aspects under (A)(1) and (2) above have led to conflicts of
national interests and jurisdiction and hence to confrontations between
States, which have prompted some governments either to intervene as amicus
curiae in the foreign court proceedings, or to introduce protective legislation
against foreign claims to jurisdiction or evidence, or else to submit diplo-
matic notes of protest, and sometimes to two or three of. these steps.
C. As regards claims to substantive jurisdiction usually few problems arise
where some of the acts complained of are within the territory of the State
claiming jurisdiction. States cannot, however, expect to impose their con-
cepts unilaterally, applying criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions either to
conduct in another country which is permitted in that country, or for failure
to produce substantiating evidence from that other State when the latter's
laws prohibit the production of such evidence.
D. There are circumstances where it has been accepted that a State may
claim jurisdiction on the basis of effects within its territory of conduct out-
side, but subject to a number of conditions-as evidenced by the Resolution
of the International Law Association referred to earlier. But these recom-
mendations are often not adhered to by the courts claiming such jurisdiction.
Indeed, United States courts have sometimes not even accepted that the effect
within the territory must be direct and substantial, which are two of the
conditions set out not only in the International Law Association Resolution
but also in the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1965).
E. A subsidiary company must not be regarded as subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the foreign State in which its parent company is based by reason of
being its subsidiary. It is a distinct legal personality and is subject to the laws
of the country where it operates. Likewise the parent company must not be
regarded as carrying on business within the jurisdiction of the State where its
subsidiary operates, solely by reason of having a subsidiary in that country,
but only if the subsidiary carries on the parent's business within the jurisdic-
tion.
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F. A defendant cannot be condemned for failure to produce documents
from another country whose laws either prohibit such disclosure without
consent and such consent is not granted or else enable an order to be made
prohibiting disclosure and such order has been made. In neither case should
the defendant be required to prove a good faith effort to comply by seeking
from the government a waiver of the nondisclosure law or order, since this
should be a matter, where considered appropriate, for diplomatic approach
by the government seeking disclosure to the government prohibiting disclo-
sure.
G. The position under (F) should be no different where the documents
located in another country are in the possession of the defendant's locally
incorporated subsidiary, for the latter is equally bound as any domestic com-
pany there to comply with the laws of the country where it operates.
H. A distinction needs to be made between, on the one hand, discovery
involving the seeking of documents and information to establish whether
enough evidence can be found to justify the starting of proceedings, and, on
the other hand, the seeking of information and documents relating to pro-
ceedings which have already been commenced, to which the foreign company
is a party and which relate to acts by the foreign company within the territory
of the State seeking the information. The former is inadmissible in many
countries while the latter situation generally raises few problems and is often
regulated by bilateral and multilateral conventions such as the 1970 Hague
Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters. The number of countries ratifying this Convention or entering into bilat-
eral agreements for the same purpose could, of course, be increased.
I. Disclosure of documents or information to foreign authorities may be
precluded by considerations of confidentiality or privilege. In such circum-
stances, the fact that the country seeking disclosure may not regard them as
confidential or privileged is irrelevant.
J. Where conflicts of national interests arise, it is not appropriate for
courts of one State to ignore the interests of another State either by resolving
the issues on narrow factual or procedural grounds or simply by deciding that
the interests of the State of the forum must necessarily override any conflict-
ing national interests. There will, therefore, be circumstances where a balanc-
ing of those interests is required. Courts are not, however, normally equipped
to carry out this balancing or reconciliation of national interests, which may
involve complex political and economic issues and even questions of national
security and is essentially a diplomatic function.
K. It must be recognized that where some governments will order a partic-
ular course of action, other governments may consider it as a matter of prac-
tice to be sufficient for domestic purposes to authorize or approve that ac-
tion. This should be taken into account in considering the defense of foreign
sovereign compulsion.
L. Problems will also continue to arise so long as grounds for claiming
personal jurisdiction continue to differ so much. Here it should be possible to
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reach a greater degree of agreement between States through international
conventions.
M. The present OECD study into the collection of information abroad
and on fact-finding methods used in antitrust cases and proceedings may help
toward further agreement on means of resolving some of the issues raised in
this paper. However, as brought out in the OECD Council Recommendation
concerning action against restrictive business practices affecting interna-
tional trade,6 any rules which are developed to facilitate investigation and
discovery by competition authorities of relevant information within the con-
trol of an enterprise under investigation, where such information is located
outside their national territory, must be consistent with international law,
take into account international comity and the provision of the information
must not be contrary to the law or established policies or significant national
interests of the country where the information is located. Furthermore, ac-
count must be taken in the latter country of appropriate safeguards, includ-
ing those relating to privilege and confidentiality.
"Adopted July 20, 1978.

